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SITUATION

\TIII.

There is 'var between States X and Y. State Z is
neutral. A commander of a war vessel of State X n1aintains that a private vessel of neutral State Z 'vhich has
aided State Y by transmitting wireless telegraph messages is liable to capture as guilty of unneutral service.
He also maintains that neutral State Z should assume
some responsibility for the use of "\Yireless telegraph
within its own jurisdiction.
The con1mander is asked for a brief statement of the
restrictions which might well apply to the use of wireless
telegraphy in time of "·ar.
Under present conditions, "That statement might he
make?
SOLUTION.

(a) A belligerent may regulate or prohibit the use of
wireless telegraph within the area of hostilities.
(b) A neutral state should use reasonable care to prevent within its jurisdiction the unneutral use of wireless
telegraph. ~
(c) Unneutral use of "Tireless telegraph on board a
vessel makes the vessel liable to the penalty of capture
by a belligerent. or to confiscation or sequestration of the
apparatus~ or of the vessel, or of both by a neutral.
(d) _A_ vessel intentionally aiding a belligerent by the
use of wireless telegraph is liable to the penalty until the
end of the war.
NOTES ON SITUATION VIII.

l'l ature of service.-·The usefulness of wireless telegraphy, which a fe,v years ago 'vas problematical, is now
amply proven. This "\Yas sho,vn in the South . .~:frican
war, some of the German wars in Africa, and in the
Russo-Japanese 'var.
The general principle of 'Yireless telegraphy is based
on the fact that the oscillation of an electric spark generates ether 'va ves, usually called, from the discoverer,
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Hertzian waves. As these waves were discovered in 1887,
it is but natural that no extended internationalla"~ precedents in regard to their use have yet been established.
The Hertzian waves may move to a considerable distance
in any direction from the generator. They may by
proper apparatus be received at any point 'vithin this
sphere. The present lack o£ control o£ the direction
in which the 'vaves may move differentiates the service in
this respect-from that o£ wire telegraphy.
There are various systems o£ transmitting and receiving
the Hertzian 'vaves. Certain states have given preference to a single system, 'vhile other states permit the use
o£ several systems. 1,he Telefunken system is used in
G-ermany and in the German navy. The same system is
receiving favorable consideration in Holland, Kor,vay,
and South American States, and also Sw·eden, and has
been the subject o£ experimental use in so1ne o£ the British dependencies. In Russia the Popoff systen1 is used.
The Rochefort and the Ducretet systems ha Ye received
support in France. The Marconi system has exclusive
rights in Italy and extensive use elsewhere. In the
United States the Telefunken, Deforest, and ~larconi
s3rstems are in use. Certain countries have special systems or variations o£ the above systems in use. The great
diversity in control and in operation shows the need o£
governn1ental and international regulation.
Control of submarine cables.-The principles o£ control as stated in the Naval "\Var College lectures on Submarine Cables in 1901 seems to apply in some respects to
wireless telegraphic equipment. It ~as maintained in
regard to submarine cable$ that, " The right to legislate
£or this form o£ property is, therefore, in the po,-ver of
the state, or in case no legislation has been enacted, the
legal control is in the proper department o£ the government." This position was affirmed by Secretary }~ish as
early as July 10, 1869, as £ollow·s:
It is not doubted by this GoYernment that the con1plete control
of the whole subject, both of the permission and the regulation of
foreign intercourse, is with the Government of the United States,
and that, howeYer suitable certain legislation on the part of a
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State of the rnion may become, in respect to proprietary rig-hts
in aid of such enterprises, the entire question of allowance or
rn·ohibition of means of foreign intercourse, commercial or political, and of the terms and the conditions of its allowance is under
the control of the GoYernment of the United States. (Sen. Doc.
122, p. G5.)

President Grant took practically the sa1ne position in
his n1essage of December, 1875, and since that ti1ne the
position has often been reaffirn1ed. 1\Jl foreign submarine cables 'having a ter1ninus in the United States
have been landed under a distinct condition that the
'·executive permission is to be accepted and understood
by the company as being subject to any future action of
Congress in relation to the \vhole subject of submarine
telegraphy." An opinion of the Attorney-General, in
accordance \Yith \vhich the President \vas entitled to act
and to order all th~ departments of executive character to
act~ sums up the matter as follo\YS:
The preserYation of our territorial integrity and the protection
of our foreign interests is intrusted, in the first instance, to the
President. * * * The President bas charge of our relations
with foreign powers. It is his duty to see that in the exchange
of comities among nations we get as much as we gb·e. He
ought not to stand by and permit a cable to land on our shores
under concessions from a foreign power which does not pennit
our cables to land on its shores and enjoy there facilities equal
to those accorded its cable here. * * * The President is not
only the head of the dir)loma tic sen·ice, but Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy. A submarine cable is of inestimable serYice to the Government in communicating with its
officers in the diplo1na tic and consular service, and in the Army
and Navy when abroad. The President should therefore deman<l
that the Government have precedence in the use of the line, and
this was done by President Grant in the third point of his message
* * * The ExecutiYe permission to land a cable is, of course,
subject to subsequent Congressional action. The President's authority to control the landing of a foreign cable does not flow from
his right to permit it in the sense of granting a franchise, but
from his power to prohibit it should be deen1 it an encroachment
on our rights or prejudicial to our interests. The unconditional
landing of a foreign cable n1igbt be both, and therefore to be
prohibited, but a landing under judicious restrictions and conditions might be neither, and therefore to be permitted in tb{'
promotion of international intercourse. (22 Opin. Atty. Gen.,
p. 25.)

GERl\IAN AGREEMENT.

141

In a later decision it 'vas held thatthe same restriction applied to the landing of submarine cables
in Cuba in the time of military occupation on the island. (Ibid.,
p. 515.)
There can, then, be no doubt that for the executive branches
of the United States Government the principle of control by the
President is established in absence of any legislation to the contrary. (Wilson, Submarine Telegraphic Cables in their International Relations, p. 11.)

Agreement between United States and 6'-er1nany.-The
conditions under which submarine cables are perInitted to be laid and operated within United States
territory are sho,vn in the following memorandum:
~lEl\IORANDUJ\1.

In the matter of the application of the Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft of Germany for permission to land on the
shores of the United States a submarine telegravh cable, to be
laid between Germany and the United States.
The President having (luly considered said application, hereby
consents that said company may lay, construct, land, maintain,
and operate telegraphic lines or cables on the Atlantic coast of
the United States, to connect Borkum-Emden, in the Empire of
Germany, and the city of :New York, touching at the Azores.
It is a condition to the granting of said consent that said company first file with its said application, in the Department of
State, its written acceptance of the terms and conditions on
which said consent is given, to wit:
I.

That neither the said company, its successors or assigns, nor
any cable with which it connects, shall receive from any foreign
government exclusive privileges which would prevent the establishment and operation of a cable of an American company in the
jurisdiction of such foreign government.
II.

That the company has received no exclusive concessions from
any government which would exclude any other company or
association, which may be formed in the United States of
America, from obtaining a like privilege for landing its cable or
cables on the shores of Germany, and connecting such cable or
cables with the inland telegraph system of said country.
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III.

That the said company shall not consolidate or amalgamate
with any other line or combine therewith for the purpose of
regulating rates.
IV.

That the cmnpany will, in the transmission of official messages,
give precedence to messages fron1 and to the Government of the
United States of .America and of other governments.

v.
That the rates charged to the GoYernment of the United States
sllall not be greater than those to any other government, and the
sn id rates and those charged to the general public shall never
exceed the present telegraphic rates between said counties, and
sl.lall be reasonable.
VI.

That the Go,·ernment of the United States shall be entitled to
the same or similar privileges as may by law, regulation, or agreement be granted by said company or its successors or assigns to
any other government.
VII.
That the citizens of the United States shall stand on equal footing as regards the transmission of messages over said company's
lines with citizens or subjects of Germany or any other country
with which said cable may connect.
YIII.

That messages shall ha\:e precedence in the following order:
(a) Government messages and official messages to the Government.
(b) Service messages.
(c) General telegraphic messages.
IX.

The said line shall be kept open for daily business, and all
m.essages in the order above be transmitted according to the time
of receipt.

X.
That no liability shall be assumed by the Government of the
"Cnited States by virtue of any censorship which it may exercise
over said line in the event of war or civil disturbance.
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XI.
That tile consent hereby granted shall be subject to any future
action by the Congress or by the President, affirming, revoking,
or modifying, wholly or iu vart, the said conditions and terms
OIL which said permission is given.
(U. S. Foreign Relations, 1899,
p. 311.)

The conditions set forth in this meinorandum sho'v that
the United States retains full po,ver over cables 'vhich are
permitted to operate ·within its jurisdiction. This principle of control would involve censorship over or even discontinuance of the service. The control 'vould also involve so1ne degree of responsibility. It may be reasonable
to expect, so far as practicable, a corresponuing control of
'vireless telegraphy. The medium of communication is
not the same, but the principles involved are to some extent similar.
Report of lnter-Depart1nental Board.-The conclusions
of the Inter-Departmental Board on wireless telegraphy,
made to the President of the United States, July 12, 1904,
are:
'l'hat the maintenance of a complete coastwise system of wireless telegraphy by the Navy Department is necessary for the
efficient and economical management of the fleets of the United
States in time of peace and their efficient maneuvering in time
of war.
That the best results can be obtained from stations under the
j L1risdiction of one Department of the GoYernment only, and that
representatives of more than one Department should not be quartered at any station.
And finally the Board concludes that the GoYernment must take
the necessary steps to regulate the establishment of commercial
wireless telegraph stations among the States and between nations.· (Report, p. 9.)

Report of General Board, f!\Tavy.-Some form of effective Government control of wireless telegraphy seems
necessary both for commercial and military reasons. It
also seems proper that as in the postal service, and in the
telegraph service in certain States, Government employe~s
Bhould be placed in charge of the wireless communication. The General Board, Navy Departn1ent of the
United States, in a report to the Secretary of the Navy,
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:Jiay 2, 190±. considered the question of control of 'vireless telegraph.
'l'he report considers specific points. It states:
2. The questions are:
\Yhether or not all wireless telegraph stations belonging to the
Government on or near the seacoast ought to be under a COlllmon
control'!
If so, which Department of the Governlllent can best exercise
the control?
\Yha t is necessary in order to control private seacoast wireless
telegraph stations?
3. In all this discussion the tenn "seacoast" includes all wireless telegraph stations capable of comn1unicating with ships at
sea, whatever their actual distance inland, and includes the Great
Lakes and the insular possessions of the United States, as well
a~ the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts.
4. The following facts n1nst, in the opinion of the General ~oard,
form the basis of the decision :
5. The principal defect of wireless telegraphy, the liability to int~rference, renders some central control indispensable to the
iutegrity and effectiveness of any wireless telegraph station.
"-"ithout control over the placing of other stations, any wireless
telegra11h station may be rendered absolutely useless eithPr by
ae:c:ideut or design.
6. The control of all wireless telegraph stations belonging to
the Government can be accomplished by Executive order. In
order to control private stations, general legislation by Congress
will be required, both because wireless telegraphy bridges the
boundaries between States and because it stretches beyond the
territorial limits of the nation.
7. The principal use of wireless telegraphy is now, and long
will be, at sea-between Bhip and ship, or ship and shore. On
~hore other means of communication always exist, often better,
always possible substitutes. 'l'he common telegraph or telephone,
or the heliograpb, permanent or portable, is everywhere available
to the soldier or meteorologist. Permanent outlying stations can
be connected by su~marine cables. Although wireless telegraphy
may be an added convenience, on shore it never can be indispensable. But from ships at sea, out of sight of flags or lights, and
beyond the sound of guns, the electric wave, projected through
space, invisible and inaudible, can alone convey the distant message.
8. In the present state of the science, developn1ent and experiment must be carried on largely at sea. 'Ve know as yet little
of the limitations or possibilities of marine and transmarine communication. 'l'he Navy is the only Department of the Government that has facilities for this branch of the work, and, irre-
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apective of what is done by other Departtnents, tl.te :Navy must, in
its own interest, continue to experiment and to communicate
between its sl.tips and the shore.
D. To the Navy, wireless telegraphy is absolutely essential. All
the battle ships and larger cruisers, perhaps even torpedo boats,
are or will be equipped with it-as foreign navies are-to comInunicate with each other, as well as with the shore.
10. The Navy has already 20 wireless telegraph stations ·on the
seacoast and proposes to establish no less than 60 more. The
Navy has already ma~e arrangements to receive at its stations
and to transmit over the land telegraph lines wireless nwssages
from passing merchant vessels. The Army has 2 stations in use
in Alaska and 2 others for experimenting, and has considered
placing 1 at the Golden Gate on the Pacific coast. The "'\Vea ther
Bureau has 2 stations and proposes to erect 7 more. All these
stations, except the 2 in Alaska, which are for communicating
with each other, are for the purpose of communicating between
ships at sea, or in a few cases outlying islands and the mainland.
Several of the Army and Weather Bureau stations interfere, or
will interfere, with those of the :Navy.
11. From these facts it appears clear that it would be in the
interest of all to put the seacoast wireless telegraph stations belonging to the Government" under the control of one Department.
That control must extend to the determination of sites, and probably to the choice of systen1s, in order to prevent the several
Departments from frustrating one another's efforts. It does not
seem to the General Board that there will be much difference of
opinion on this question.

14.

*
*
* * *

*

*

*

*

{1) It is absolutely necessary in time of war that the observers
stationed to receive messages from the fleet should be subject
to military law-that is, enlisted men of the Navy. Civilian
tnarine ·observers, however skillful in reporting n1erchant ships,
could not so well be trusted to distinguish the wireless messages
of friendly frmn hostile n1en-of-war, or to transmit accurately
technical naval signals, and could not be trusted at all with
the secret signal codes of the :Xavy. Whoever mans the seacoast
stations in time of peace, the Navy must man them in time of war.
(2) Unless the Navy mans the stations in time of peace it
will not have the trained force ready to man them in time of
war. Practice with instruments on shipboard alone will not suffice. The man to be trusted at a seacoast station in time of war,
alert to detect the unexpected, n1ust be familiar with the usual
local business in time of peace. The opportunity for training the
signal men is no less important than testing the apparatus.

*

*

25114-08-10

*

*

*

*

•

146

"\VIRELESS TELEGRAPJIY.

lG. The subject of legislation to control priYate wireless telegraph stations on the seacoast is of growing importance to the
GoYernment because of the increa~e in the number of them and
their liability to interfere, ma licionsly or accidentally, with the
GoYernment's sta'tions. In order to safeguard its own interest,
both in peace and war, tbe Go,·ermnent must haYe some means
to preYent the erection of a printte wireless telegraph station
within the range of interference of one of its own. It would
not be wise, in the opinion of the General Board, for the GoYernmeut to undertake to manage all the seacoast wireless telegraph
business of the country, nor for an industry of such growing
commercial utility to be controlled directly by a military branch
of the goYernment. The Department of Commerce and Labor,
now charged witll tlle adtninistration of the Light-IIouse SerYice, the Coast SurYey, the Inspection of Steamboats, and the
jvrisdiction o,·er n1erchant shipping generally, would perhaps
be the most natural one to control priYate wireless telegraph
co1npanies. The law should clearly giYe the GoYernment priority
of right and prohibit the erection of any priYate station without
thE approYal of the Go,·ernnlei~t.

International agree1nent, 1903.-There "\Yas a·n international agremnent on certain points bet,veen several
states at a convention held at Berlin August 4-13, 1903.
Austria, France, Ger1nany, Hungary, Russia, Spain, and
the United Staies signed the protocol as fol1o".. s:
FINAL PHOTOCOL.
The delegations to the preliminary conference concerning wireless telegraphy designated below:
Gernmny, Austria, Spain, the United States of America, France,
Hungary, Hussia, are unanin1ous in proposing to their Governntents to exan1ine the following general bases for an international
conYention:
ARTICLE

1.

Exchange of correspondence between ships at sea and coastwise
'\Yireless telegraph station opened to general telegraphic service
is subject to the following rules:
SEc. 1. All stations whose field of action extends to the sea are
called coastwise stations.
SEc. 2. Coastwise stations are required to receiYe and transmit telegrams originating on ships at sea wi thont distinction as
to the systems of wireless telegraphy employed by said ships.
SEc. 3. The contracting states make public the technical points
of nature to facilitate and accelerate communication between
coastwise ~tations and ships at sea.
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However, each of the contracting Governments can authorize
stations situated in· its territory, under such conditions as it may
deem proper, to utilize several installations or special arrangements.
SEc. 4. The contracting states declare their intention to anopt,
in order to establish the tariffs applicable to telegraphic service
between ships at sea and the international telegraphic system,
tbe following bases:
The total charge to collect for this service is established by the
word. 1t cmnprises( a) The charge for transmission o\·er the lines of the telegraphic systen1 of which the amount is that fixed by the international telegraph regulation in force attached to the St. Petersburg Convention.
(b) r.rhe charge pertaining to the marine transmission.
The latter is, as the former, fixed by the number of words, this
nun1ber of words being counted according to the international
telegraphic rule as indica ted in the paragraph above (a).
It comprises1 o. A charge called "charge of the coastwise station," which
goes to said station.
2°. A charge called "charge of the ship," which goes to the
station installed on the ship.
The charge of the coastwise station is subject to the approval
or the state on whose territory it is established, and that of the
ship to the approval. of the state whose flag the ship carries.
Each of the two charges should be fixed on the basis of equitable renumeration for the telegraphic work.
ARTICLE

II.

A regulation which \vill be attached to the proposed convention
will establish rules for the exchange of conununica tions between
coastwise stations and those placed on board ship.
'l,he prescriptions of this regulation may at any time be mo~ified
by common agreement by the administration of the contracting
Governments.
ARTICLE

III.

The rules of the telegraphic con ,·ention of St. Petersburg are
applicable to transmission by wireless telegraphy in so far as
they are not contrary to those of the proposed convention.
ARTICLE

IV.

Wireless telegraph stations should, unless practically impossible, give priority to calls for help received from ships at sea.
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ARTICLE V.
The sen·ice of operating 'Yireless telegraph stations . should
be organized, as far as possible, in a manner not to interfere with
the service of other stn tions.
ARTICLE YI.
Contracting Governments reserve to themselves, respectively,
the right to make special arrangements themselves, having for
their object to oblige the companies operating wireless telegraph
stations in their territories to observe, in all their other stations,
the prescriptions of the proposed convention.
ARTICLE VII.
The prescriptions of the proposed convention are not applicable
to the wireless telegraph stu tions of the state not open to general
telegraphic service, sa Ye in that which concerns the clauses
which Articles IY and Y are intended to cover.
ARTICLE VIII.
Countries which have not joined the proposed convention will
be admitted at their request.
Done at Berlin August 13, 1903.
(Then follow signatures of delegates for Germany, Austria,
Spain, the United States of .America, France, Hungary, Russia.)
DECLARATION OF THE DELEGATION OF GREAT BRITAIN.
While engaging itself to submit the above bases to the examination of its Government, the British delegation declares that, in
view of the situation in which wireless telegraphy finds itself in
the Unted Kingdom, this delegation ought to maintain a general
reserve. This reserve relates especially to section 2 of the first
article and to the application of the rules of Article V to the
stations indicated in Article YII.
Done at Berlin August 13, 1903.
(Signatures follow·.)
DECLARATION OF THE ITALIAN DELEGATION.
The delegation of Italy, while agreeing. to submit to the exami- ·
nation of its Government the propositions contained in the final
protocol of the conference, ought, agreeably with the declarations
made by its members in the several meetings, to make on account
of the Government the following reservations:
ART. I, SEc. 2. It would accept the proposed text only on condition of the following addition being made: "Provided, that all
these systems give a known guarantee for good working in re-

149

BERLIN CONVENTION, 1906.

ciprocal correspondence with respect to the range, to the perfection of the organization and to the surety of communications."
ART. I, SEc. 3. It can not accept the first paragraph of this section because in the agreements concluded with l\I. l\Iarconi the
Government engages to keep the details of the installations secret.
ART. VI. It can not accept the text of this article, and it should
limit itself to the declaration on the part of its GoYernment that
it will endeaYor to introduce in the agreements stipulated with
~I. l\Iarconi some modifications in the desired direction.
Done at Berlin August 13, 1905.
(Signatures follow.)
By Article III of this protocol the rules of the St. Petersburg
conYention are adopted so far as consistent.

Berlin Wireless Convention, 1906.-The following
5tates are parties to the International Wireless Telegraph
Convention concluded at Berlin, November 3, 1906: Germany, the United States of America, Argentina, AustriaIIungary, Belgiun1, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark.
Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, ~1onaco, Norway, the N eth~rlands, Persia, Portugal,
Roumania, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and Uruguay.
ARTICLE

-1.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to apply the provisions of the present ConYention at all radiotelegraph stations-coast station and ship stations-open for the serYice of public
correspondence between the land and ships at sea which are
established or worked by the Contracting Parties.
They undertake, moreover, to impose the observance of thesP
provisions upon priYate enterprises authorized either to establish
or work radiotelegraph coast stations open for the serYice of
public correspondence between the land and ships at sea, or to
establish or work radiotelegraph stations, whether open for
public correspondence or not, on board ships which carry their
flag.
ARTICLE 2.
The term "Coast Station" means any radiotelegraph station
which is established on land. or on board a ship perman~ntly
moored, and which is used for the exchange of correspondence
with ships at sea.
The term " Ship Station " means any radiotelegraph station
established on board a ship which is not permanently moored.

*

*

*

*

*

*
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ARTICLE

16.

GoYernments which haYe not taken part in the present Convention shall be allowed to adhere thereto on their request.
This adhesion shall be notified through the diplomatic channel
to the contracting GoYernment under whose auspices the last
Conference has been held, and by it to all the others .
.Adhesion inYolYes as a matter of right of acceptance of all the
ela uses of the present ConYention and adinission to all the advantages stipulated therein.
ARTICLE

17.

The proYisions of .Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 17 of the
International Telegraph ConYention of St. Petersburg of the
J0/22 July 1875 are applicable to international radiotelegraphy.a
a Extract from the International Telegraph Convention signed at St.
Petersburg, July 10/22, 1875:
ARTICLE

1.

The High Contracting Parties concede to all per~ons the right to correspond by means of the international telegraphs.
ARTICLE

2.

They bind themselves to take all the necessary measures for the purpose of insuring the secrecy of the correspondence and its safe transmission.
ARTICLE 3.
They declare, nevertheless, that they accept no responsibility as regards the international telegraph service.
ARTICLE

5.

Telegrams are classed in three categories:
1. State telegrams: those emanating from the head of the Nation, the
Ministers, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Naval forces, and
the Diplomatic or Consular Agents of the Contracting Governments, as
well as the answers to such telegrams.
2. Service telegrams: those which emanate from the Managements of
the Telegraph Service of the Contracting States and which relate either
to the international telegraph service or to subjects of public interest
determined jointly by such Managements.
3. Private telegrams.
In the transmission, the State telegrams shall have precedence over
other telegrams.
ARTICLE 6.
State telegrams and service telegrams may be issued in secret language,
in any communications.
Private telegrams may be exchanged in secret language between two
States which admit of this mode of correspondence.
·
The States which do not admit of private telegrams in secret language upon the expedition or arrival of the same, shall allow them to
pass in transit, except in the case of suspension defined in article 8.
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21.

The High Contracting Parties retain their full liberty concerning radiotelegraph installations not coYered by Article I, and, in
particular, concerning naYal and military installations, which are
subject only to the obligation of Articles 8 and 9 Gf the present
Conyention.
Nevertheless, when these installations carry on public correspondence, they shall conforn1, for the performance of this service,
to the stipulations of the Regulations so far as concerns the manner of transmission and the accounting.
ARTICLE

22.

The present Convention shall come into operation on and from
the 1st of July, 1908, and shal~ remain in force for an indefinite
period, or until the expiration of a year from the date of denunciation.
Denunciation only takes effect as regards the Government in
whose nan1e it is made. The Convention shall remain in force as
regards the other Contracting Parties.

General control of messages.-The Supreme Court of
the United States stated in 1886 thatA telegraph company occupies the sa,me relation to con1rnerce

as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a
carrier of goods. Both companies are instrun1ents of con1merce
ARTICLE

7.

The High Contracting Parties reserve the right to stop the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the safety
of the State or which may be contrary to the laws of the country, to
public order or good morals.
ARTICLE 8.
Each Government also reserves the right to suspend the international
telegraph service for an indefinite period, if deemed necessary by it,
either generally, or only over certain lines and for certain classes of correspondence, of which such Government shall immediately notify all the
other Contracting Governments.
ARTICLE

11.

Telegrams relating to the international telegraph service of the Contracting States shall be transmitted free of charge over the entire systems of such States.
ARTICLE 12.
The High Contracting Parties shall render accounts to one another of
the charges collected by each of them.
AnTICLJ~

17.

The High Contracting Parties reserve respectively the right to enter
among themselves into special arrangements of any kind with regard to
points of the service which do not interest the States generally.
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and their business is commerce itself. They do their transportation in different ways and their liabilities are in some respects
different, but they are both indispensable to those engaged to any
considerable extent in conunercial pursuits. (Telegraph Co. v.
Texas, 105 U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 460.)

The governn1ent n1ust necessarily control coininerce,
and it is thus proYided according to the fundamental law.
"'\Vireless telegraphy would be a matter of comn1erce and
accordingly properly subject to goYernmental control.
Such control has been quite regularly exercised in regard
to telegraphy by means of wires. It is generally recognized that governn1ent control 1nay be expedient both
from con1mercial and 1nilitary reasons. Austria, France,
Germany, I-Iungary, Russia, and Spain control their telegraph lines. If such control is, and it seems to be, both
legal and expedient, then goYerninent control of \vireless
telegraphy should be asstnned.
In the consideration of \vireless telegraphy certain complications arise. The analogy to ordinary telegraphy is
not complete. ,.Vhile a 1nessage n1ay be sent fro1n a giYen
point, it will not as in the ordinary telegraphy moYe only
in a direction determined by the sender. In ordinary
telegraphy the ,,rire upon which the 1nessage travels is
tangible and 1nay be cut if it can be reached. The destination of the message n1ay be inferred if the course of the
\Vire is known. The apparatus of the ordinary telegraph
is practically stationary, even though in land warfare a
certain degree of n1obility is secured at times. This is,
however, very limited and n1ay not extend to n1ariti1ne
movements. There must be wire connection bebveen the
sending and receiving stations. Their locations may be
known, and hence the jurisdiction may be determined.
The transmission o£ dispatches may thus be controlled.
~Iost governments ha Ye n1aintained some control over
land telegraphy and a general control over submarine
lines, even \Yhen connecting with a foreign state. It
is generally admitted that each government may when
necessary in war assu1ne control of the 'vire telegraphy.
The uncontrolled use of w·ireless telegraphy \Yould not
long be tDlerated by any government ''hich desired to
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protect itself. This is particularly the case at present
because by present methods the sending of messages from
one station may interfere with similar work in another.
Control of telegraph in time of war.-The general
principles governing the relations of belligerents and
neutral are not changed by the introduction of wireless
telegraphy. The burden of the conduct of the 'var should
not be thrown upon neutrals, nor should neutrals participate in the war.
From the nature of 'vireless n1essages, they may reach
1nstruments within neutral jurisdiction without any guilty
participation on the part of those within neutral jurisdiction. There is no means by \Yhich the neutral can prevent the receipt of such messages other than by rendering
the station useless. Such action would not be similar to
that of sealing a cable connecting with belligerent territory, for the sa1ne wireless instrument may receive
messages from any source and is not, like the cable, limited to a connecting station easily determinable. It would
not be reasonable to demand that a neutral should close a
station simply because it might receive dispatches fro1n a
belligerent. Nor 'vould it always be possible for a given
station to determine the character of a message which it
might receive, because its source might be uncertain, or
if the source were kno"~n the 1nessage itself might be
apparently innocent in character. The possibility of neutral control of wireless messages 'vithin neutral jurisdiction 'Yould be quite different from that of control of wire
1nessages.
In the consideration of the treatment of submarine
cables in time of war the 1nain question was one of interruption of a material connection between t'vo points.
In wireless telegraphy interruption may take place
whether intentional or unintentional without possibility
of fixing clearly the responsibility for the interruption.
Interruption or interference may be no more than tenlporary and probably could nnt be permanent. The message transmitted may not be sent in a single direction or
to a single point.
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'I'he fifth section of the Brazilian neutrality proclaination of 1898 states:
That it is prohibited, citizens or aliens residing in Brazil, to
announce by telegraph the departure or near arrival of any ship,
merchant or war, of the belligerents or to give to them· any order,
instructions, or warnings, with the purpose of prejudicing the
enemy.

'l:'he last clause of this prohibition is of such a character as to render its enforcen1ent difficult, because it 'vould
by implication make necessary that hostile intent on the
part of the person dispatching the message should be
proYed. K eutrality does not consist sin1ply in absence
of hostile intent or absence of " purpose of prejudicing
the enemy." The quality of the act determines its
character, and even though there may he no " purpose of
prejudicing the enemy," an act 1nay prejudice the enemy.
The Treaty of 'Vashington maintained that "due diligence " should be exercised in order that a neutral might
not injure a belligerent. The general doctrine o£
neutrality imposes the bbligation upon the neutral state
that it shall be of neither party. If the last clause were
omitted from the section of the Brazilian proclamation
it would be more effective.
l~urther, jt n1ay be said that the prohibition applies to
persons resident in Brazil only, if a strict interpretation
is to be given to its first clause. It does not prohibit the
use of the means of communication for the purposes
specified, but prohibits certain persons from using the
telegraph for certain purposes. It 'vould apparently
leave the telegraph open to the officers of vessels of either
belligerent if they chanced to be in a harbor of Brazil,
:for they certainly could not be brought under the category of " citizens or aliens residing in Brazil " against
\vhom prohibition runs; The Brazilian proclamation of
1898 is, however, indicative of an early attempt of a
neutral to regulate the use of the telegraph in time of
war.
It is unquestionable that a single message sent from a
neutral port may under certain circumstances be of
greater service to a belligerent than a vessel equipped
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"~ithin

and sent fron1 the san1e port to a belligerent.
""\\Tith the introduction of 'vireless telegraphy the possibility of use of a wireless station within neutral jurisdiction
for belligerent purposes is increased. The method of
control is complicated from the fact that wires are not
necessary and direct evidence of transmis~ion of messages is not easily obtainable.
In 1898, during the Sanish-American war, the British
Governnient declared that it 'vas "not at liberty to coinply 'vith the proposal of the Government of the U nit€d
States " to allow an American company to land a new
cable to connect Manila and Hongkong. This decision
has received general approval. If permission to establish a neutral ter1ninal for a cable connecting with a
belligerent should be refused, then similarly permission
to establish a wireless station should be refused. The
fact that the wireless station was within the Russian
consulate at Chifu did not make the station at that point
set up mainly for 'var purposes permissible.
The Dutch East Indian authorities during the RussoJapanese 'var of 1904-5 made regulations for the refusal
at certain stations of telegramsthe contents of which are unintelligible to the Dutch officials, or
telegrams regarding the movements of ships or troops and which
are of interest to the belligerent powers-Russia and Japan.
Telegrams in a language agreed upon, the words of which are
taken from a commercial or other code, n1ay be admitted, provided the code made use of is submitted to the Dutch officials.
and that the text when translated in to open language can cause
no inconvenience.

Sir John Macdonell, 'vriting in July, 1904, says:
, The Institut. de Droit International in 1879 adopted a resolution that in time of war cables connecting neutral countries were
inviolable. At its meeting in Brussels the Institut passed a series
of resolutions which probably express the general understanding
as to what is right and proper. After reaffirming the inviolability of cables connecting neutral territories, the Institut added:
"Le cable reliant les territoir~s de deux belligerants ou deux
parties du territoire d'un des belligerants peut etre coupe partout,
excepte dans la mer territoriale et dans les ea ux neutralisees
dependant d'un territoire neutre.
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" Le cable reliant un terri to ire neutre au territoire d'un des
belligerants ne peut en aucun cas etre coupe dans la mer territoriale ou dans les eaux neutralisees dependant d'un territoire
neutre. En haute mer, ce cable ne peut etre coupe que s'il y a
blocus effectif et dans les limites de la ligne du blocus, sa uf
·10tab1issement du cable dans le plus bref delai possible. Ce
cable peut toujours etre coupe sur le territoire et dans la mer
territoriale dependant d'un territoire ennemi jusqu'a une distance
de trois milles marine de la baisse de basse-maree."
Few of those who discuss the subject dwell sufficiently upon
the differences between contraband or quasi-contraband and vessels conveying the same and telegrams and submarine cables.
Telegraphic communications may be called quasi-contraband.
But yon do not seize a vessel bec..'luse it 1nay be carrying contraband; you do not destroy it if it does; you do not confiscate it
if the owner has acted innocently. Transmitting messages to
belligerents may be likened to breaking a blockade. But the
analogy is faint. You do not destroy vessels which may break
it; you do not capture them, unless the blockade is effective.
In a maritime war a cable is smnething sui generis. A belligerent can not exercise over it any right similar to that of
search; it may be an instrument of war much more important
than a cargo of contra band or a block.ade runner; the fa~t to
hEl recognized is that he may be ~afe only if he cuts it. "rhf~
hesitation of States unable to foresee circumstances in which interruption to ~able communications might be vital to them is
natural. Looking to what may hang upon telegraphic communication-transports intercepted, a fleet destroyed, the fate of a
eampaign affected-it is too much to expect belligerents always to
keep within the four corners of the rules which I ba ve quoted.
There \viii be circumstances, it may be anticipated, in which they
will not suffer, if they can help it, a telegraphic cable, no matter
who is the owner or what are its termini, tv be used to their
<letriment. To whatever rules they assent will probably be
added the sacramental formula, " So far as circumstances permit." (56 The Xineteenth Century, p. 148, Interna tiona I Questions and the Present 'Var.)

Liability of vessels transmitting messages.- The
Japanese Regulations Governing Captures at Sea, 1904,
gi Ye a general list of vessels liable to capture:
ART. X)G~VII. Any vessel tba t comes under one of the following cate~ories shall be captured, no matter of what national
character it is:
1. Vessels that carry persons, papers, or goods that are C'ontraband of war.
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2. Vessels that carry no ship's papers, or have willfully muti7
la ted or thrown them a way, or hidden them, or that produce
false papers.
3. Vessels that have violated a blockade.
4. Vessels that are dee1ned to have been fitted out for the
enemy's military service.
5. Vessels that engage in scouting or carry information in the
interest of the enemy, or are deemed clearly guilty of any other
act to assist the enemy.
6. Vessels that oppose visitation or search.
7. Yessels voyaging under tlle convoy of an enemy's man-of-war .
...

Later these regulations state :
ART. XLVI. Vessels that are recognized to have been fitted out
for the enen1y for n1ilitary purposes, and the goods belonging to
the owners of such vessels, shall be confiscated.
ART. XLVII. Vessels ascertained to have scouted or carried information to give benefit to the enemy or to have done any other
aets to assist him, and all goods belonging to the owners of such
Yessels, shall be confiscated.

Section 5o£ Article XXXVII makes liable to capture~
regardless o£ nationality, "Vessels that engage in scouting or carrying information in the interest o£ the enemy,
or are deemed clearly guilty o£ any other act to assist the
enemy," and Article XLVII makes such vessels liable to
confiscation. These regulations would certainly apply to
vessels engaged in transmitting wireless messages o£ a
character to assist the enemy. Such vessels would then
be liable to capture and confiscation as would the portion
of the cargo belonging to the owners o£ the vessel, together· with the apparatus.
.
lVireless telegraphy at Ohifu.-One of the cases o£
use o£ wireless .telegraphy during war to which atten6on has been particularly given is that o£ the use o£ the
station at Chifu during the Russo-Japanese war. The
station at Chi£u was within the grounds o£ the Russian
consulate, which, according to the practice in China, was
entitled to the right o£ extraterritoriality. The station
communicated particularly with Port Arthur and was
apparently mainly used £or war purposes.
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Professor ''roolsey says:
Is the toleration of this practice by China an unneutral act?
Precedent or analogy and reason are the lights to guide us in
such an inquir)r as this. Xow the closest analogy is to be found
ia the international status, during war, of the world's submarine
cable system. This, in great 11art, is equally out of a belligereufs reach: too deep in the sen to be grappled, it equally binds
belligerent and nPutral together. There is an international agreement concerning submarine cables, but this pro \"ides only for their
protection in normal thnes. .Article XV reads: " It is under·
stood that the sti11ulations of this ConYention slJnll in no wise
affect the liberty of action of belligerents." 'Vhnt liberty ot
action does the belli~erent claim'! I-Iere the only question in dispute rPlates to the right to cut a neutral-owned cable running
between hostile and neutral 11oints beyond the three-mile limit of
tlle neutral state. nut this doe·s not bear upon the problem of the
wirele~.s, for the new method bas no tangible apparatus except at
the termiunl points, wllich are by our supposition, the one hostile,
tlte other neutral. As for the cable end in neutral waters or
lnnded on neutral soil, it is absolutely beyond the reach of the
bt:llJigerent. Thoug-h not subject to force, is it not subject to be
scaled on demand of a belligerent on the ground of neutral obligation? In other words, is the neutral state bound to prevent one
belligerent from using freely for all purposes a cable landed
within the former's jurisdiction and which the other belligerent is
unable to interrupt?
'There semns to be a disposition to in1pose this burden upon the
neutral. Yet to do so is surely at Yariance with the entire theory
(,f neutral obligation hitherto recognized. To carry hostile dispatches, to se1Te as a belligerent transport, for instance, are unneutral sen·ices on the part of the neutral individual, punished
IJy confiscation of the Yebicle of offense. But it is the belligerent,
not the neutral, by existing usage, who bears the onus of preYentioil<. The neutral is bound to preYent the use of his territory
as a base of operations, to forbid the fitting out of enemy sbi11s of
war in his ports, but not to restrain enemy's dispatches or diplornatic agents or financial agents. all haYing, it may be, a Yery direct influence upon the conduct of war. The distinction is
hetTI·een direct military preparation on neutral soil, llke an
al'med expedition, and military news or orders, a difference as
wide as the poles. l\Ioreoyer, if the neutral is held bound to preYent a belligerent's use of a submarine cable between the twoalready in established use--or to allow it only under censorship,
is be not equally bound to limit the belligerent's use of a land
tPlegrnph line establishing similar communication, and would not
neutral censorship of belligerent mails be a duty also? If the
established and safe principle be abandoned, that neutral com-
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merce and con1munica tions are to be as little interfered with as
tLe needs of war allow, 'vith a vresumvtion in favor of greater
r:tther than less exemption, are we not launched on a 11ath of
neutral obligation which speedily and necessarily leads us to an
nhsurd and impossible standard·: ( 'Yireless Telegraplly in \Var,
J1 Yale Law Journal, 248.)

Further, Professor \Voolsey says of the wireless at
Chifu:
If set up and in commercial use before the war, it would be
Yery hard to stop its use-as being an unneutral service-after
Port Arthur was beleaguered. But it was not so set up. On
thP contrary, the wireless connection was devised as the only
aYailable n1eans of enabling Port Arthur to communicate with St.
Petersburg. By it news was sent out and orders returned. It
had especial tnilitary value, and no other Yalue. Profes~or Lawrence stu tes that the wireless sen· ice was abolished by China in
Angust, but this, I am informed, is an error. Russia nearly to
the end was able to in1pose her ·will, in this. as in some other
particulars, upon the Chinese authorities. Xevertheless, in the
light of reason and by the force of analogy, China should have
forbidden this use of her soil to the belligerents from the first.
By pennitting it, she has committed a breach of neutrality to the
detriment of .Japan. (Ibid, p. 251.)

lVireless telegraphy as a ne~ws-gathering agency.-The
'vords of the correspondent of The Times (London), who
conducted the "'ork of the wireless in the Russo-Japanese
war. are very suggestive. l-Ie says, in part:
It was my lot to be intrusted with the system by which The
'l'·imes was able on many occasions to publish messages from
points of vantage which were not accessible to the representatiYes of· any other journal in the world. This has now come to
an end. A combination of ad\·erse circumstances, over which it
has no control, has made it necessary for The Tint-es to discontinue its 'vireless service. Therefore, as wireless telegraphy, as
a journalistic adjunct in the operations of war, has probably been
tlSPd under 111y direction for the first and last time, it may be interesting to the reading public to note the circumstances under
wllich The Tintes enterprise was conducted. the success which it
:1 ttainecl, and the ultilna te reason of its failure.

*

*

*

*

*

•

•

Before I left England I detern1ined in my own mind that the
na Yal campaign would 'vork out very much as the last few
tnonths ha Ye proYed-tha t is, I expected that the main interest
for the first six months would center in and about the Yellow
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Sea anu tbe Gulf of Pe-chi-li.

This being the case, the existence

of a British possession, situated as is \Vei-hai-wei, and connected

directly with tbe land cable sen·ice, stood out alone as the spot
most suited for a receiving station. I therefore decided upon
\Yei-hai-wei, although considerable pressure was brought on me
t<J establish the station elsewhere.

The syste1n \\as brought to ""\Yorking order, when the
correspondent says:
On returning to Wei-bai-wei I was faced with the announcement that the British Admiralty at Hongkong bad classed our
f:ita tion as a breach of neutrality and had forbidden the na YY to
have anything to do with us on any condition. I was also led to
understand that the home a ntborities were seriou~ly contempla ting an order which would render Wei-hai-wei impossible for us
as a base. .\..s soon as the difficulty was presented to me I stateu
the whole case to the com1nissioner at \Yei-hai-wei, with the result
that this officer was satisfied tlm t he could allow the station to
remain without embroiling himself in difficulties with either of
the belligerents.

Late in :\:larch of 1904 the correspondent says:
Our apparatus was now working so well that we were beginning to make other uses of it than merely for transmitting news
from the theater of the sea operations. \Ve were now able to
receiYe both Russian and Japanese messages. These messages
of course carne in cipher, and, as we possessed no key, it was impossible to make any improper uses of messages thus received,
but" we could easily recognize the difference in the system employed, and by this means-and here another very important
thing in favor of our system was proved-we were able, approximately, to tell the distance we were from the various ships.
~loreo...-er, our operator, who was extremely expert, began to
rpcognize the notes of various ships; that is to say, he could tell
if a Russian ship was at sea by listening for the answering communication from the shore. He could also detect whether the
Japanese messages were being transmitted by relay to the naval
base or whether the fleet itself was at sea. This of course was to
us possibly of more value than if we had been able to decipher
the actual messages sent, and during the period that the Haimun
was in operation during April our most successful issues resulted
from a careful listening for the wireless telegraphy of the opposing fleets. We listened, and came to conclusions which invariably
correctly guided us in our movements. For instance, if for a
space of six hours on end the Japanese were absolutely silent we
knew that Togo had taken to the sea, for invariably when he
entered upon some enterprise for the time being all wireless
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communication ceased. This being the case, we knew exactly
·wliat course to steer, but even at this period we had not fully
realized how successfully o"Ur system had been installed.

In regard to the use of the apparatus, the correspondent
says:
It may be readily understood that we were very careful not to
use our wireless telegraphy until the battle ships themselves
were engaged with the Port Arthur batteries. The reason for this
is obvious. If we had commenced to send news of the _position
of the rival fleets, we should have at once interfered with the
wireless telegraphy of both belligerents. · This would certainly
have been an unfriendly act, but, although we did not use our own
instrument for sending, we listened attentively. The Russians
were hard at work. They were just repeating the alphabet ovet
and over again in order to " queer" the Japanese recording instrument. In fact, I am not sure. it was not the constant use
made by the Russians of their shore stations that prevented Togo
from coming up in time to catch l\lakaroff's squadron outside.
There is some discrepancy in the times given when the Japanese
decoy squadron sent its messages to Togo and when )Iakaroff
decided that he was too far out at sea, and re~haped his course
towards Port Arthur. It was only when the Russians stopped
their "queering" process in order to receive a message from the
Bayan that the Japanese Second Class Cruiser Squadron was
able to get an interval in which to send its all important message.
We received both messages, the Japanese, of course, being in
their own private cipher, that from the Bayan being half in cipher
with a few words in French and signed "B. A." But when once
Togo had hoisted his fighting flag and sailed in under the guns
of Port Arthur we felt that we were justified in sending just a
sbort message, and s_p at 9.15 we sent a brief report from within
se\en miles of Port Arthur, which furnishes the first record of a
wireless message reporting a naval engagement being sent direct
from the scene of operations to the office of the journal which was
to give it to the public.
We were now working so well thtlt there was no necessity for
us to return to 'Vei-hai-wei. Later in the evening when the
Japanese had finished sending Jnessages, we were able to send
fuller reports of the day's fighting as we steered a course for
Chinampo. It had so happened that early in the morning the
British sloop Espiegle, returning after wintering at Niuchwang,
saw part of the operations. She arrived in Wei-hai-wei late in
the afternoon and she gave to se\eral correspondents who were
stationed at the British port some news of the engagement. This
was the first news other than that sent via St. Petersburg that

-
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arrived in Europe, with the exception of the short message sent
by u~. I just mention this to show that by means of our wireless
system we saved eight hours, even thongh the unlucky chance
was against us that the E8piegle happened to be passing at that
particular timl'.

The nse of the \Vireless systen1 by The Tilnes correspondent on the H ailnun \Yas soon after put under
restrictions by both belligerents, and the correspondent
concludes his account by saying:
I maintain that Tile Times has ampl~· demonstrated the value
and possibilities of wireles~ telegraphy in conjunction with journalistic enterprise; in fact, I am inclined to think that it has demonstrated its uses too well and that the success of the systen1 has
assisted in its downfall. ::\IoreovPr, I an1 convinced that it will
ultimately prove that 'l'he Times has been the first and last journal
tt' use wireless telegraphy to report naval warfare. Although I
am positive that in our hands the system was always put to
!•roper uses, yet the possibilities and the dangers are so great that
in futur~ the use of a II wireless communications during military
3nd naval operations will be con trolled by in tern a tional law.
(The Times, London, ..\._ugust 27, 1904.)

On April 1:), 1904, the Russian a1nbassador sent to Secretary Hay the follo,ving comn1unication:
I am instructed by my Govern1nent, in order to avoid every
possible n1isunderstanding, to inform your excellency that the
lieutenant of His Imperial ~Iajesty in the Far East has just n1ade
the following declaration :
"In case neutral vessels, having on board correspondents who
may com1nunicate war news to the enemy by means of improved
apparatus not yet provided for by existing conventions, should
be arrested off the coast of Kwantung or within the zone of operations of the Russian fleet, such correspondents sha II be regarded
aR spies, and the vessels provided with wireless telegraph apparatus shall be seized as lawful prize."

In reply to the communication, on the sa1ne date, Secretary Hay said:
In taking note of this declaration the Government of the
United States does not waive any right it may have in international law in the case of any American citizen who may be
arrested or any American vessel that may be seized under it.
(U. S. Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 729.)
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The British version does not seen1 to agree 'vith the
An1erican. La 'vrence mentions this and refers to proper
penalties for use of wireless telegraph in forivar<.ling 'var
ne"~s:

01; April 20, Earl Percy, the under-secretary of state for
foreign affairs, in answer to a question in the House of Commons,
gave an account of Admiral ~\lexeiff's order, which differed by a
very important word from the American version. He spoke of
~'correspondents who are eonununica ting infornut tion to the
.enemy;" whereas the pbra~e in the W'"ashington telegram ran
"correspondents who may comnnulica te ne·ws to the enemy."
There is all the difference in the "·orld between being in a position to do an act and actua ll~· doing it. If I an1 left alone in my
neighbor's dining room, I may steal his spoons; but it would be
very bard if that faet alone secured my condemnation on a
ebarge of larceny. But let us suppose for a moment that information is actually communicated to the enemy. Then, without reference to espionage, Russia has ample means of punishing
::tny neutral, whether newspaper correspondent or not, who sends
to the Japanese from the theater of hostilities news of the dispositions of the Russian fleet. The law of unneutral service
applies to him. He is in the same position as if be bad carried a
dispatch for the enemy, or signaled between two of his squadrons.
IIis ship and apparatus are justly confiscate, together with all
cargo that belongs to him or to the owner of the vessel. These
sevet·ities might surely be deemed sufficient, even if there had
been an actual transmission of intelligence direct to the Japanese
commanders. (Lawrence, \V'ar and Neutrality in the Far East,
·2d ed., p. 85.)

The translation as appears in the clause of the ,,...ashington telegram cited by Professor Lawrence does not
mention the important reservation of the American version, that the prohibition relates to a specific kind of
news, viz, war news.a
a The original French text as communicated by the Russian representatives to foreign states was as follows:
" Je suis charge par mon Gouvernement, afin d'eviter tout malentendu
possible, de communiquer a Votre Excellence que le Lieutenant de Sa
Majeste Imperiale en Extreme Orient vient de faire la declaration
suivante:
1
'Dans le cas oil des \"apeurs neutres, ayant a bord des correspondants
,qui communiqueraient a l'ennemi des nouvelles de guerre au moyen
d'appareils perfectionnes n'etant pas encore prevus par les conventions
existantes,-seraient arretes aupres de la cote du Kuantoung ou dans la
zone des operations de la flotte russe,-les correspondants seront envisages
comme espions et les vapeurs, munis d'appareils de telegraphie sans fil,.saisis en qualite de prise de guerre."
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1\.ccording to Scholz, solicitor for the German postoffice, the following principle 1night be laid do,vn 1n regard to the use of 'vireless telegraphy:
A belligerent has the right to prohibit, within the zone of hostilities to be defined by him nnu publicly announced, the disseminaticn of information as to the whereabouts and movements of his
war and n1erchant vessels, and other warlike 1neasures, by means
of wireless telegraphy on board neutral vessels. Violations
whereby facts requiring secrecy are divulged with the knowledge
or as the result of the negligence of the captain of the ship entail
capture and condemnation of the ship, independently of the fact
whether the ship intended to render aid to the hostile partye
Capture is permissible only witbin the zone of hostilities, but
there during the entire period of the war.
If the transmission by wireless telegraphy is combined with
acquisition of the information under the aggravating circtunstances of espionage, the guilty persons are subject to the punishInent provided for this offense. (Drahtlose rJ.lelegrapbie und Neutrali tii t, p. 45.)

Of the restriction of the use of 'vireless equipment by
news-gatherers to a given area, Professor \Voolsey says:
A restriction as to the locality within 'vhich the wireless system of news gathering might operate must also be mutually
agreed on by the belligerents, to be of value, unless control of the
E~a lies absolutely in the hands of one of them.
In any case, if
respected, this restriction would make it impossible to get anything of value. While if not respected-and could flesh and
blood withstand the temptation-there comes about friction, coercion, the need of constant surveillance, leakage of dangerous information.
By process of exclusion we reason, therefore, that news-gathering by sea, with the aid of wireless, is of such a nature as to be
inadmissible in warfare, and to require entire prohibition under
penalty of confiscation. It is a service bearing an analogy to the
dispatch boat, the submarine cable, and the war correspondent,
in peculiar combination. The dispatch boat is guilty of unneutral
service in behalf of one combatant and can be confiscated by the
other; the submarine cable can be cut or worked at the belligerent
end under censorship; the war correspondent, by universal usage,
is only allowed to accompany an army subject to strict regulations. The wireless news-gatherer, combining the dangerous
qualities of all three, should not be permitted at all. ('Vireless
Telegraphy in War, 14 Yale Law Journal, p. 254.)

0 pinions as to wireless service.-The wireless systems
are not yet fully perfected.

Certain systems have been
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exclusively adopted for a period of years in some states.
The relations of one method of transmission to ~nother
are not yet fully understood. A private individual may
possess an equipJP.ent with which he may transmit for
others messag~s of great importance, or receive or interrupt government messages of great importance.
It is evident that it may not always be possible to tell
the source, the destination, or the signiftcance of a wireless message. The attempt to class such messages under
some theory of contraband or violation of blockade would
lead to conclusions which it would be difficult to sustain
by logical processes.
In military operations wireless telegraphy has, sin~e
the South African war, become more and more an established means of communication. By it, different portions
of the forces can keep in communication with each other
or with headquarters without the danger that wires may
be cut and while moving from place to place.
The importance and use of submarine cables in Inaritime warfare is materially affected by the introduction of
the system of 'vireless telegraphy. The regulations which
\vere gro,ving up in regard to the use of cables cannot in
all respects be extended to cover the use of wireless co1nn1unication.
Many neutral vessels are now equipped with wireless
apparatus. Neutral ships are permitted with fe'v limitations to navigate freely. The range of wireless transmission is so extensive that it may usually pass beyond the
possible area of belligerent operations over which the
be1ligerent has control. The neutral can in an apparently
innocent manner transmit information to a belligerent
and n1ay receive certain valuable information without
being open to criticism. Unlike messages transmitted by
wires, the source and destination of wireless messages are
not easily discoverable. Guilt is not easily fixed.
Thonier speaks of the possibility of introducing the
principle applicable to contraband, saying:
La recente invention de la telegraphie sans fil va rendre souvent
inutile pour le belligerant la destruction des cftbles qui relient
e11tre les differents points du territoire ennemi ou le territoire
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eunemi et les pa~ s neutres. La situation creee par ce nou,·eau
nwde de com111unication est sans analogue et necessite, de toute
nrgence, l'etablissement d'une reglementa tion particuliere, afin
de determiner les lhnites dans lesquelles peut s'exercer les droits
des belligerants d'interdire aux neutres certains agissements
prejudiciablcs.

*

*

*

*

*

II parait d'abord possible d'assimiler les appareils de telegraphie sans fil a des articles de contrebande, n1ais la ressemblance n'est qu'apparente. Le motif qui pousse le belligerant a
capturer les marchandises prollibees est la certitude qu'elles auront
entre les mains de l'ennemi nne destination hostile, en raison de
leur nature et de leur destination. La contrebande n'est de quelque
utilite il celui-ci qu'autant qu'il ra en sa possession. Tel n'est
pas le cas des appareils de telegraphie sans fil places il borcl des
navires neutres. Ils sont utilisfs indirecte1nent par l'ennemi, sans
passer par ses mains, sans parYenir meme a son territoire, sans
perdre leur caractere de propriete nentre et en continuant a
fa ire partie integrante de rarmewent clu na Yire nentre.
Le caractt-re illicite de ces batiments neutres ne peut n1eme pas
etre determine par leur direction ennemie, qui constitue un criteriulll absolument insuffisant parce que contradictoire et Yariable.
Tantot, en effet. la direction ennemie est suiYie dans le but d'aider
l'adversaire a renouer ses comn1unica tions interrompues, tan tot
elle cache l'intention nnisible pour ce meme adYersaire d'anuoncer au monde les moln·e1nents de ses eseadres ou de ses troupes
et d'intercepter ses depeches confidentielles.
Ce serait done plutOt en se fondant d'abord sur le de,·oir des
un,·ires neutres de ne pas aider l'ennemi et de ne pas se mettre
a son sen·ice, puis sur la faculte pour le belligerant d'empecher
tens les actes des na Yires neutres de nature :.1 mettre obstacle a
rexercice de son droit de gnerre tlue les belligerants pourraient
s~dsir les na \"ires nentres pourYus (fapva reils de teU•graphie sans
fil. Si les neutres ont le droit de Yoir res1)ecter leurs lH'Oprietes et
meme leurs transactions a Yec les IJelligerants. ils out, nons l'a yons
YU, le deYoir correlatif de ne vas entra Yer les opera tious de
g-uerre de ces derniers. Or, ils portent gran~went atteinte an
droit de libre belligerance des nations en lutte en s'immis~ant
ainsi directement dans les hostilitf>s. (De la Xotion de Contrebande de Guerre, p. 334. )_

l-Ie :further says:
II nons semble que ce droit de saisie pourrait s'exercer dans
deux cas:
1 o Lorsque le na \"ire neu tre porteur d 'appareils de telegraphie
sans fil se tronYe assez proche du thefttre des hostilitl's ou du
tc·rritoire de run ou de rautre belligerant pour pou,·oir se serYir

INTERRUPTION OF CABLE SERVICE.
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de ses appareils a leur profit on a leur detriment. Le perimetre
dans lequel la presence du navire sera consideree comrne illicite
pourra etre determine d'apres le rayon efficace maxin1um des
belligerants, soit autour dn thefUre des hostilites;
2° Lorsque ce na vire neutrc se dirige vers Je lieu des hostilites
ou vers le territoire des belligerants. (II~id., p. 336.)

Scholz Inaintains thatA neutral power is bound to \vatch carefully that through the
wireless telegraph installations under its authority "·ar dispatches, in so far as they are to be considered as transportation
prohibited l)y international law, are not transmitted, if the neutral
power must assume, in vie'v of the situation of local conditions,
that its installations will be used for such dispatches. Generally
speaking, the duty to refuse private dispatches written in cipher
does not exist. A neutral power is neither authorized nor bound
by virtue of its neutrality to subject the official dispatches of
another power to censorship.
'Vhen a shore or ship station for wireless telegraphy has come
into hostile power, a neutral power which knows this to be the
case and undertakes to correspond with such station is bound to
regulate any censorship going beyond the provisions of the foregoing paragraph in such manner as to have private telegrams in
cipher refused. It is further bound to urge any private company
in interest which may be established within the territory under
its sovereignty to adopt such censorship. (Dralltlose Telegraphie
und Xeutralitiit, p. 9.)

In the Naval ,.Var College lectures in 1901~ a:fter citing
some o:f the bases for interruption o:f cable service, it is
stated thatAnother element in the cable operation is such as to make it
possible to bring the act, under certain circumstances, within the
limits of what is now termed unneutral service, which includes
the know·ing carriage or repetition of messages of the enen1y by
a neutral. If this principle is to be generally recognized, and it
doubtless must be if wireless telegraphy becomes widely practicable, ·then the transmission of messages by cable is one of the
means by which unneutral sen·ice n1ay be most easily rendered,
and provision must be made to check it. The neutral landing
place of the cable would be the seat of an act of the nature of an
nnneutral sen·ice as truly as a vessel which, on the high seas,
repeats a n1essage of a belligerent at one point to his fellowbelligerent at another point, more or less distant, with a view to
aiding him, either for pay or for reasons of friendship. \Vhile
the neutral landing place of the cable can not be seized any
more than can the neutral ship if it be within the neutral jurisdiction, the act in either case can be a subject of protest, and if
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continued may be a basis for damages. If the cable be one connecting with the belligerent territory it may, outside of the
neutral jurisdiction, be interrupted. Of course a cable between
two neutral points can not perform such service, and is therefore
not liable to interruption. (Wilson, Submarine Telegraphic
Cables in their International Relations, p. 23.)

Rolland discusses certain points in regard to the use of
wireless telegraphy.
He says:
Dans !'hypothese d'une guerre maritime, ces solutions restent
vraies mais elles ont besoin d'etre completees. II convient en
effet, ici encore, ue donner a chaque belligerant les moyens
d'assurer le respect de ses defenses. II doit, par suite, d'abord
lui etre possible de visiter les na vires neutres de maniere i1.
s·assurer qu'ils ne servent pas A correspondre par telegraphie sans
fil. l\Iais faut-il aller plus loin? Lorsqu'il s'agit du transport
de correspondances postales, on admet generalement que, si le
belligerant trouve sur un navire de commerce neutre des depeches
pro hi bees, il a le droit de confisquer et les depeches et le na vire.
II n'y a d'exception que pour les paquebots postaux places dans
uue situation particuliere a cause qu'ils participent a un service
public international. Pareillement, lorsqu'il s'agit des depeches
telegraphiques transmises par cable sous-marin, on reconnait
assez g£meralement au belligerant, sur le ~erritoire duquel le
cable vient aboutir, le droit de restreindre ou de couper la communication. On lui permet meme de rompre les cables aboutissant chez son adversaire au cas de blocus ou de contrebande de
guerre.
II convient, nous s~mble-t-il, de poser en notre matiere des
r~gles assez voisines.
Le na vire neutre vi site a-t-il enfreint la
defense de correspondre par telegraphie sans fil, le belligerant
peut d'abord lui interdire de rester dans sa zone d'operations.
Nous pensons meme qu'il est en droit de confisquer, tout au
moins de mettre sous sequestre, les appareils de telegraphie dont
est muni le na vire. Par la, il donne une sanction efficace a sa
prohibition en meme temps qu'il en assure le respect dans
l'avenir. Les navires neutres n'ont au surplus rien a dire s'ils
ont ete avertis de !'interdiction de communiquer. Ceci s"n.pplique,
bien entendu, lorsque les depeches transmises etaient innoceutes.
II va de soi que s'il est demontre que les mouvelles transmises
par telegraphie sans fil par ce navire neutre etaient destinees
a fournir a I' autre belligerant des renseignements rela tifs a la
conduite des hostilites, on peut · aller plus loin. Dans ce cas, le
navire neutre s'est n1is en qnelque sorte au service d'un belligerant. L'autre a le droit de confisquer et le double des depeches
et les appareils et le naYire lui-meme. lei encore, cependaut, il
faut faire une exception pour les paquebots postaux. De ceux-ci,
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la participation a un service international a une telle importance
qu'elle ne doit point etre ralentie. Le belligerant ne peut done
que saisir le double des depeches et ecarter le na vire de sa zone
d~operations.
(La telegraphie sans fil et le droit des gens.
(13 Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1906, p. 86.)

Rolland also says in case of a station in a neutral state,
but ~ot belonging to it, from w !nch wireless messages are
sent:
En principe, I'Etat neutre doit presumer que Ies emissions
d'ondes faites soit d'un hotel d'ambassade, soit d'un navire ancre
dans un de ses ports, n'ont pour but que de transmettre des depeches privees on Ies correspondances adressees par I'ambassadeur d'un belligerant a son gouvernement. Toutes ces depeches
sont innocentes, il faut done Ies laisser passer. Le principe est
hers de doute, mais ii ne faut pas oublier non plus que I'Etat
neutre est oblige de s'abstenir de toute immixtion dans Ies hostilitfs. Surtout ii convient de rappeler qu'il ne doit pas souffrir qu'un
belligerant se serYe de son territoire comme point d'appui pour
se~ operations militaires. A. supposer done qu'il soit demontre
qu'un navire neutre on belligerant, stationne dans les eaux territoriales, communique par telegraphie ·sans fil des renseignements
relatifs a la conduite des ho_stilites a un belligerant, que !'installation faite d'un appareil de telegraphie sans fil sur un hotel d'ambassade n'a manifestement d'autre objet que de permettre a une
place assiegee de communiquer a ,~ec le dehors, l'Eta t neutre se
trouvera tenu d'interdire de telles enlissions.
Que I'on n'exagere pas d'ailleurs la portee de cette derniere
conclusion. Elle n'est evidemment admissible que s'il est manifeste que I'instalJation telcgraphique et !'emission d'ondes ont
pour objet une Yeritable participation aux operations rnilitaires.
La chose n'apparaitra pas, en fait, tres souYent clairement. Si
des Iors il y a la moindre hesitation soit sur la nature des tillegrammes, soit sur leur destination, on doit les presumer pacifiques
et I'on ne peut plus faire au neutre une obligation de Ies interdire.
Par ailleurs, I'Etat neutre n'est oblige de formuler une interdiction que si !'emission d'ondes impliqne reellement ]'utilisation de
son territoire comme point d'appui. Il en est ainsi quand Ia communication emane d'un hotel d'ambassade, d'un navire a I'ancre
dans un de ses ports ou stationne dans sa mer territoriale, d'un
ballon captif neutre partant d'un point de son territoire. (13
Revue Generale de Droit International Public, p. 89.)

The general matter of trans1nission messages is stated
as follows:
No overt act could be performed by a neutral in aid of a belligerent more clearly unlawful than the transmission of signals or
the carrying of messages between two portions of a fleet engaged
in concert in hostile operations, and not in sight of each other. It
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makes no difference whether such fleets or squadrons are in ports
of their own country, in neutral ports, or on the high seas, or
whether such signals are transp1itted by the neutral directly or
through a repeating neutral vessel. :Xo matter whether such communications be verbal or written, imvortant or unimportant to the
general re~nlts of the war, as the criminality of the act depends
alone upon the nature of the sen·ice in which the neutral is engaged. The sanw principle extends to signaling or bearing of
n1essages between. a land force an<l a fleet, or to the laying of a
cable to be use<l chiefly or exclusively for hostile purposes.
(Taylor, International Public Law, p. 754, sec. 670.)

In regard to 'vireless telegraphy it has been said:
\Yireless telegraph communications are to be treate<l like cables.
'l1be belligerents 1nust have the right to interrupt these communi-

cations between portions of the Ol)ponent~s territory, or between
points of a hostile and a neutral country. by seizing floating
stations-including those belonging to neutrals, which must be
returned subsequently-or by establishing intercepting stations.
(Commander von Uslar, 181 ~orth American Heview, 187.)

Scholz, speaking of the penalty for trans1nission of
wireless messages, says:·
Finally, the contraband and blockade law, with its positively
formulated legal consequences, can not be applied analogously to
cases where it is less a question of commercial tratnc than of
direct interference with the interests of the belligerents. \Vben
such unneutral interference bas taken place, the neutrality bas
been forfeited. It is obviou~, therefore, that the ship can not
acquire immunity frmn punishment npon reaching the nearest
vort, still less upon the transmission of the news; otherwise the
doors would be opened wide to violations of neutrality.
On the other ban<l, unlimited liability to punishment in tilne of
war is not in bannony with the principles of international maritime law. Such nnlin1ited liability would be justified only in
cases where intention of aid to belligerents can be viainly established from the sbip~s behavior. In such cases she acquires the
character of a hostile ship, intended for warlike actions. But
where such intention <loes not exist, and these are the only cases
to be con~idered in this connection, the liability of the ship n1ust
be n1ore accurately defined under the international maritime
law in its present shape. The most expedient solution appears
to n1e to be that accor<ling to which the capture of a ship is
permissible only within the "zone of hostilities," but there during
the entire duration of the war. If a ship could acquire immunity
from punishment by leaving this zone, so that she coul<l not be
pursued upon reeutering it, it would compel the belligerents to
extend the zone beyond reasonable bounds. It is true that a
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neutral ship which has her home port in the Yicinity of this
zone-which, of course, can not embrace neutral territorial
waters-nu1y be in danger of capture during the whole period of
the war. But it should be remembered that a ship which, notwithstanding the prohibition issued, lends herself to the nnneutl'al
dissemination of war news is not entitled to the sa1ne leniency
as a ship engaged in the pursuit of her commercial interests which
violates the contraban·d or blo~kade law. The unneutral dissemination of war news is much more closely related to the case
of "prendre part aux hostilites" than to that of prohibited
transportation.
If the solution suggested is not adopted it seems to me that
the only other solution could be to consider the arriyal at the
home port as the point to terminate liability, for it woul<l not be
just to the interests of the belligerents if the right of repression
were to cease when the ship reaches the nearest (home or neutral)
waters. But, under this Yiew, which would again pern1it "Raisie
au retour," such a ship might become liable to warlike acts eyen
in distant oceans. Limitation to the "zone of hostilities" recognizes the idea of the localization of war measures and forms perhaps the most expedient compromise of conflicting interests .

. .\_ccording to the foregoing, the
might be laid do""'n :

follo"~ing

principles

.A. uelligerent has the right to prohibit, within the zone of hos-

tilities to be defined by hin1 and publicly announced, the disselnination of information as to the whereabouts and 1noyen1ents
uf his war and merchant Yessels, and other warlike measures, by
means of wireless telegraphy on board of neutral vessels. Violations whereby facts requiring Recrecy are diYulged with the
h:nowledge or as the result of the negligence of the captain of the
ship entail capture and condemnation of the ship, independently
of the fact whether the ship intended to render aid to the hostile
party. Capture is permissible only within the ~":one of hostilities,
but there during the entire period of the war.
If the transmission by wireless telegraphy is con1bined with
acquisition of the infonnation under aggravating circumstances
of espionage, the guilty parties are subject to the punishment proYided for this offense. (Drahtlose Telegraphie und Xeutralitiit.
fl. 43.)

'rhere can hardly be any doubt as to the correctness of the
theory that a neutral r)ower cannot permit its telegraph offices to
bP used for the purpose of working harm to a belligerent. It is
true that a neutral power is not bound, generally speaking, to
preYent the exportation of contraband of war by pri ,·ate individuals, although in the n1ost important cases, according to the
Three Rules of ".,.ashington, the contrary is uuiYersal law. In
any event a neutral power is bound to watch carefully that it does
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not itself become a carrier of contraband. It cannot use considerations of operation, still less of privacy of telegran1s, as a
pretext for pern1itting the transmission of official telegraphic war
dispatches, any more than it could allege, in case of carrying contraband on its national ships, that it did not have to concern it~elf
with the destination of the articles in question. If such were not
the case, a belligerent could use neutral telegraph installations
without restriction for its war dispatches, so that what is strictly
prohibited by the medium of mail on the sea would be permitted
by telegraph. Hence a certain censorship follows from the duty
of neutrality. (Ibid., p. 7.)
'Vhile the privilege of free and uncontrolled telegraphic communication with their home country, even in time of war, is generally
accorded diplomats and consuls, this privilege is based entirely on
the supposition that the inforn1ation exchanged behyeen a belligerent power and its representative residing in a neutral country relates to the affairs of the neutral country, hence, that the subject
of it is neutral and does not affect the conduct of the war. That
is not the case where the object is to provide for an invested
fortress communication with the outside world, in particular with
a representative of the home government. In the latter case it is
not a furtherance of neutral interests, but constitutes aid to a
belligerent. (Ibid, p. 15.)

The neutral state is also under some obligation.
"'hen a floating telegraph station is in the service of a neutral
telegraph company and conveys to such company important news
bearing on the war or news obtained by way of espionage, and
the company disseminates such news, the neutral state, upon
learning of the case, would be bound to interfere. But what the
state is bound to prohibit is not the unneutral manner of obtaining news outside of its sovereign territory, but the transmission
and dissen1ination of such news, injurious to the belligerents,
within the territory under its sovereignty. (Scholz, Drahtlose
Telegraphie und X eutralitlit, p. 12.)

Professor Hershey, in a recent book, concludes:
But in view of the possible injury which may result to belligerents from the use of wirele~s telegraphy on the high seas or on
neutral territory, some concessions should perhaps be made to
military necessity, provided neutral rights and interests are not
seriously impaired. Interference with wireless messages by neutrals on the high seas might, under cert.'lin circumstances, be permitted by helligerents, as also the seizure and confiscation of
wireless telegraphy apparatus as contraband of war, and neutrals
should certainly refuse to permit the use of their territory for
n1i1itary purposes. (International Law and Diplomacy of the
Russo-Japanese \Var, p. 123.)
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Despagnet says:
1\Iais il semble difficile de ne pas reconnaitre aux belligerants,
sauf dans les eaux territoriales neutres, le droit de controler ou
me me d'interdire toute com1nunica tion par la telegraphie sans fil,
soit avec l'ennen1i, soit avec le territoire qu'ils occupent ou avec
1(\urs navires, puisqu'ils ont le droit de censurer les depeches
venant du theatre des hostilites ou meme d'eloigner tout batiment
neutre qui gene leur action mifitaire. Par analogie a Yec ce que
l'on adrnet pour les cables SOUS-nlarins que le belligerant peut
couper meme entre un pays neutre, d'une part, et l'ennemi ou luirneme, de !'autre, on doit reconnaitre qu'il peut interdire !'usage
de la tel{~graphie sans fil dans tout le rayon oft elle peut etre
efficace pour saisir des informations Yen ant so it des armees so it du
pnys adYersaire. (Droit International Public, 3d ed., p. 848.)

Speaking of the right to restrict the use of wireless
telegraph, l{ebedgy says:
Le belligerant pourra exercer ce droit sur le theatre de la
guerre; cela comprend, dans la guerre maritime, la mer littorale
des belligerants et la pleine mer; cela exclut done la mer littorale
des neutres, ainsi que les parties de la mer conventionnellen1ent
neutralisees.
Ceci etant, les mesures que le belligerant peut prendre pour se
preserver des inconvenients possibles a. son egard de l'emploi de
la teH~graphie sans fil sont de deux sortes: il peut ou bien l'interdire completement, ou bien la soumettre a certaines restrictions. (La Telegraphie sans Fil et la Guerre, 6 Re\ue de Droit
International, p. 447.)

'There is much difficulty in determining the extent of
the area of hostile operations in a manner satisfactory to
belligerents and to neutrals. \Vith the increasing range
of guns this area has correspondingly enlarged. The
speed and endurance o£ vessels o£ war has also influenced
the extent of effective control. Effective scouting has
'vith the system o£ wireless telegraphy become much extended. A wireless apparatus may be o£ great service
even though far removed from the immediate area of
hostilities. The location of the apparatus is not determinable as are the generally fixed termini o£ the wire·
systems. The point at which the wireless equipment may
be is not ahvays the important element in the transmission o£ the message. The nature o£ the service rendered
cieems to be the main question. The service may be of
as much or possibly o:£ more advantage to a belligerent
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if the apparatus is seYeral hundred 1niles distant rather
than near the scene of hostilities, e. g., it 1nay be of greatest i1nportance for a belligerent \Yhose forces are son1ewhat separated to know a considerable ti1ne in advance of
the approach of the enen1y, in order that the separated
forces 1nay be concentrated. To fix an area outside of
\Vhich \Yireless service, \Vhatever its character, is free does
not seen1 feasible in actual practice.
It is evident that persons \Yho engage in the transinis. sion o£ \Yireless 1nessages cannot properly be regarded
and treated as spies. (See Situation VII, International
La \V Situations. X a val ''rar College, 1904.)
It is also evident fron1 the Chifu incident and £ron1 the
tendency of opinion that a neutral is responsible to a
reasonable extent for the establishn1ent on its territory of
stations for the operation of \Vireless telegraphy. The
state can accordingly exercise such control over these
stations as 1nay see1n expedient.
Regulations of I nst1'tute of I ntern(ttional La'w.-.At the
session of the Institute of International La\v in Septeinber, 190G, the follo,Ying regulations in regard to \vireless ·
telegraphy "·ere adopted :
DISPOSITIOXS PRELIMINAIRES.
ARTICLE PREMIER.
L'air est libre. Les Etats n'ont sur lui, en
tt>mps de paix et en temps de guerre, que les droits necessaires a
leur conservation .
. A. RT. 2. A defaut de dispositions speciales, les regles applicables
a la correspondance telegravhique ordinaire le sont a la con·espondance teH~grapbique sans til.
PRE~IIERE PARTIE.

ETAT DE PAIX.

3. Chaque Etat a la faculte, dans la mesure necessaire a
sa securite, de s'opposer, au-dessus de son territoire et de ses
eaux territoriales, et aussi haut qn'il sera utile, au passage
d'ondes hertziennes, que celles-ci Soient cruises par Ull appareil
d'Etat ou par un appareil prive place a terre, a bord d'un navire
ou d'un ballon.
ART. 4. Au cas d'interdiction de l.a correspondance par la
telegraphie sans fil, le gouvernement devra aviser immediaten1eut
les autres gouvernements de la defense qu'il edicte.
ART.

SUMMARY.
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SECONDE PARTIE.
ETA'!' DE GUEHRE.

ART. 5. Les regles a<lmises pour le temps de paix sont, en principe, applicables au temps de guerre.
ART. 6. Sur la haute mer, dans la zone qui correspond a la
svhere d'action de leurs operations 1nilitaires, les belligerants
peuvent empecher les entissions d'ondes, meine par un sujet
neutre.
ART. 7. Ne sont pas consideres comme espions de guerre mais
doivent etre traites cornme prisonniers de guerre, s'ils sont captures, les individus qui, malgre la defense du belligerant, se livrent
a la transmission ou a Ia recevtion des depeches par tel{~graphie
sans fil entre les diverses parties d'une armee ou d'un territoire
belligerant. II doit en etre autrement si la correspondance est
faite sons de faux p.retextes.
Les porteurs des depeches transmises par la telegraphie sans
fil sont assimiles a des espions lorsqu'ils emploient la dissimulation ou la ruse.
Les navires et les ballons neutres qui, par leurs communications
aYeC l'ennemi, peUvent etre COllSi<leres COlllllle s'etant llliS a son
service, pourront etre confisques ainsi que leurs depeches et leurs
appareils. Les sujets, navires et ballons neutres, s'il n'est pas
etabli que leur correspondance etait clestinee a fournir a l'adversaire des renseignentents relatifs a la conduite des hostilites,
pourront etre ecartes de la zone d'operations et leurs appareils
saisis et seq uestres.
ART. 8. L'Etat neutre n'est pas oblige de s'opposer au passage
au-dessus de son territoire d'ondes hertziennes destinees a un
pays en guerre.
ART. 9. L'Etat neutre a le droit et le devoir de fermer ou de
prendre sons son administration l'etablissement d'un Etat bellig(·rant qu'il a vait a utorise a fonctionner sur son territoire.
ART. 10. Toute interdiction de communiquer par la telegraphie
sans fil, formulee par les belligerants, doit etre immediatement
notifiee par eux aux gouverrnernents neutres. (21 Annuaire de
l'Institut, p. 327.)

Summary.-li. . roin practice, as sho,vn in various states,
from the opinions of the courts and of writers, from the
votes of conferences and from internatioilal agreements,
it is evident that the state within whose jurisdiction a
'vireless telegraph apparatus is or passes, is and 'viii be
authorized to exercise a degree of control oYer its use.
The responsibility resting upon such state 'viii be large.
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In order to avoid possible complications in time of ·
war it will be expedient in time of ·war for states, .w hether
neutral or belligerent, to exercise control over wireless
telegraphy as circumstances seen1 to require. There
see1ns to be good ground for the following general principles of action:
1. All ' private wireless stations within the jurisdiction
of a state shall exist under license and subject to regulation by that state.
2. The pri Yate stations 'vitl1in the jurisdiction of a
state may be closed, appropriated, or placed under censorship by the government in time of \var.
3. Private vessels of any nationality in time of war
may be required to render inoperative their \vireless
apparatus when \vithin or on entering the jurisdiction
of a state, whether the state is a neutral or belligerent,
and the apparatus shall thus remain while the vessel is
within the state's jurisdiction unless otherwise ordered.
4. Private vessels having ''ireless apparatus and ignorant of the declaration of war are entitled to notification before any penalty shall be inflicted.
General conclusions.-(a) . A.. belligerent may regulate
or prohibit the use of wireless telegraph within the area
of hostilities.
(b) A neutral state should use reasonable care to prevent within its jurisdiction the unneutral use of wireless
telegraph.
(c) Unneutral use of wireless telegraph on board a
vessel makes the vessel liable to the penalty of capture
by a belligerent, or to confiscation or sequestration of the
apparatus, or of the vessel, or of both by a neutral.
(d) A vessel intentionally aiding a belligerent by the
use of wireless telegraph is liable to penalty until the
end of the war.
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